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1 Introduction 
 
At the back of the abdominal cavity, just above the waist of the human body, two 
extremely vital organs are located. These organs are approximately 10 to 13 cm long 
and about 5 to 8 cm wide. They represent only 0,5% of the body’s total weight, but 
together these two organs contain about 160 km of blood vessels that receive 20 to 
25% of all the blood pumped by the heart.1 The body’s total blood supply circulates 
through these organs about 12 times per day, and every hour they filter about 7,5 
litres of blood.2 These organs have the life-sustaining task of removing waste 
products and excess fluids from the body, and they will continue performing their 
task until they have lost 75 to 80% of their function.3 These organs are known as 
the human kidneys, and although most of us are born with two kidneys, life with 
only one kidney is possible. If a person’s kidney does not perform its required 
function any more, he will have to undergo dialysis treatment until a kidney becomes 
available for organ transplantation. 
 
Organ transplantation refers to a surgical operation where an organ is taken from 
one patient’s body (also known as the "organ donor") and is placed into another 
patient’s body (known as the "organ recipient"). The objective of organ 
transplantation is to restore a happy and useful life to a patient who was once 
doomed to a premature death due to a fatal disease of a vital organ.4 
 
                                            
*  Bonnie Venter. LLB (NWU) LLM (UNISA). Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence, University of 
South Africa. Email: venter.bonnie@gmail.com. 
1  KHA 2008 http://bit.ly/ZzEJfQ. 
2  KHA 2008 http://bit.ly/ZzEJfQ. 
3  KHA 2008 http://bit.ly/ZzEJfQ. 
4  Hakim Introduction to Organ Transplantation 2. 
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Two main organ procurement systems are acknowledged internationally: an "opting-
in" system and an "opting-out" system. The opting-in system is a voluntary and 
altruistic system. According to this system a person has to give explicit informed 
consent before his death, confirming that he wants to donate his organs.5 Countries 
that follow the opting-in system include South Africa,6 Iran, the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America.7 In contrast with the opting-in procurement system is 
the opting-out system. According to this system everyone is a potential organ donor 
unless the person has registered before death that he does not want to be an organ 
donor.8 Countries that follow the opting-out system generally have a higher success 
rate. These countries include Singapore, Spain, Belgium and France.9 Neither of 
these organ procurement systems has been able to drastically improve the organ 
shortage of the countries that the systems are adopted in. 
 
The purpose of this article is to establish if the sales of human kidneys could be 
regarded as constitutionally acceptable and thus as a solution to the current organ 
shortage. The South African Constitution10 is the supreme law of South Africa, and 
any legislation that is irreconcilable with it is invalid to the extent of the conflict. In 
this article a number of sections will be analysed, namely the rights to life, human 
dignity, self-determination, privacy and healthcare. These sections will be analysed 
to establish if it would be regarded as constitutionally acceptable for a person to be 
remunerated for the donation of one of his kidneys. One is already given the option 
to save a life by donating a kidney. One should also be allowed to choose to save a 
life and be remunerated for the deed.  
 
                                            
5  Schicktanz, Wiesermann and Wöhlke Organ Transplantation 6. 
6  If a person decides to become an organ donor in South Africa he is not placed on any list. A 
person can indicate his wish to become an organ donor to the Organ Donor Foundation. Once 
this is done, the donor will receive a card and two stickers for his identification document and 
driver’s licence, to indicate that he is a donor (Organ Donor Foundation 2012 
http://bit.ly/YqtVB8). 
7  Hartwell 2010 http://bit.ly/149gfyc. 
8  Schicktanz, Wiesermann and Wöhlke Organ Transplantation 7.  
9 Hartwell 2010 http://bit.ly/149gfyc. 
10  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 hereafter referred to as the Constitution. 
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2 Human rights and kidney transplants 
 
Imagine a world where human rights are seen as inconsequential. Everybody 
including the government would be free to do as they please and to treat other 
people as they like. In this world it would not be frowned upon if people were 
discriminated against on grounds of their race, religion or sexuality. Treating human 
beings with complete disdain and utter disregard for humanity would be 
commonplace. Incarceration in concentration camps, committing genocide, these 
horrific acts would be seen as justifiable based on prejudicial rhetoric. Furthermore 
in this fictional world it would not be regarded as unacceptable if non-consensual 
experiments were performed on human beings such as having their bones broken 
and their wounds infected until they had seizures and suffered cardiac arrest.11 If all 
of this sounds familiar it is because this world without human rights once existed 
before 1947. The horrific scene described above describes only some of the 
atrocities that took place during the Holocaust. During this era human rights weren’t 
regarded as being as important as they are today and many atrocities were 
committed by the Germans against the Jewish people. The Holocaust led to the 
Nuremberg Trials,12 and these trials led to the Nuremberg Declaration that was 
promulgated in 1947.13 The Nuremberg Declaration has limited applicability as it 
deals specifically with human research and experimentation only; nonetheless it was 
the first step in the direction of the modern era of human rights.14 It was in 1948, 
one year later, however, that the most significant development in human rights took 
place – the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United 
Nations.15 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted to set 
international standards of human rights, firstly to defend individuals against the 
abusive powers of organs of state and secondly to promote the opportunity for 
                                            
11  Newman 2010 http://bit.ly/YHND7y. 
12  The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals held by the victorious allies of World 
War II. The best known of these trials was the trial of the major war criminals where German 
officials were tried for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Schmidt 
Justice at Nuremberg 4). 
13  McLean 2012 http://bit.ly/XrIpxs. 
14  McLean 2012 http://bit.ly/XrIpxs. 
15  McLean 2012 http://bit.ly/XrIpxs. 
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individuals to develop through measures such education, healthcare and the 
provision of a safe living environment.16  
 
It is clear that the relationship between human rights and medical ethics is 
undeniable. Human rights can be defined as the rights that we have as people from 
birth until death. They are comprehensively defined in various documents and 
codes.17 In South Africa they have been codified into international, regional and 
national human rights law. Firstly, human rights are protected by the International 
Bill of Rights that consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,18 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights19 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.20 As can be seen from these, human rights 
are broadly divided into categories. The three categories are civil and political rights, 
economic, social and cultural rights, and environmental rights. This article will focus 
mainly on the first two categories of human rights.  
 
Civil and political rights, which are also known as ‘first generation rights,’ were 
introduced to protect people from oppression by the state.21 First generation rights 
ensure that everyone is entitled to participation in the political process and is free 
from interference by the government as long as his or her actions are not harmful to 
others.22 An example of a first generation right is the right not to be subjected to 
medical or scientific experimentation without consent.  
 
Economic, social and cultural rights, which are also known as ‘second generation 
rights,’ were introduced because people need more than freedom from interference 
from the state to survive. For instance, they need access to economic and other 
                                            
16  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 36. 
17  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 36. 
18  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), hereafter referred to as the UDHR. 
19  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), hereafter referred to as the 
ICCPR. 
20  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), hereafter referred to 
as the ICESCR. 
21  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 37. 
22  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 37. 
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resources like food and shelter to ensure an adequate standard of living.23 An 
example of a second generation right is the right of access to healthcare. Section 
231 of the Constitution clearly states the importance of International agreements. 
The section reads that: 
 
any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into 
law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has 
been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.24  
 
At regional level South African human rights are protected by the African Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights.25 In this article both the international and regional 
human rights instruments are mentioned briefly in relation to the specific human 
rights pertaining to kidney transplants.  
 
The most important national document that protects South African human rights is 
the Constitution, or more specifically the Bill of Rights. The Constitution has a 
general impact on kidney transplants in three sections. In section 2 it is stipulated 
that the Constitution is the supreme law and that any law or conduct inconsistent 
with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. Secondly it is 
stated that the Bill of Rights must be respected, protected and fulfilled by the 
state.26 Thirdly in section 39(1) it is stipulated that when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote values such as human dignity, 
equality and freedom, and that International law must be considered and Foreign 
Law may be considered. In the Constitution there are also more specific fundamental 
human rights relating to kidney transplants such as the right to life, the right to 
human dignity, the right to self-determination, the right to privacy and the right of 
access to health-care services. These rights are discussed below. However, all of 
these fundamental human rights are not absolute and may be limited or restricted 
by section 36 of the Constitution.  
 
                                            
23  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 37. 
24  Section 231(4) of the Constitution. 
25  The African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (1981), hereafter referred to as the ACHPR.  
26  Section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
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3 Section 36 of the Constitution: limitation of rights 
 
The human rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are not absolute. The general 
limitation section of the Constitution sets out specific criteria for the justification of 
restrictions of the rights in the Bill of Rights.27 Section 36 is referred to as a general 
limitation section because it applies to all of the rights in the Bill of Rights and limits 
all rights according to the same criteria.28 It should be borne in mind that a right 
cannot be lightly limited. A law may legitimately limit a right in the Bill of Rights if it 
is a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.29 The law of general application can be summarised as follows: law for the 
purposes of this requirement is all forms of legislation,30 including common law31 and 
customary law.32 The general application requirement requires that the law must be 
sufficiently clear, accessible and precise that the persons who are affected by it can 
ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations.33 Consequently the law must 
apply equally to all.34 For the second part of the requirement that the limitation must 
be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, a number of 
relevant factors must be taken into account. These factors are:35 
 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
                                            
27  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 163. 
28  Currie and De Wall Bill of Rights Handbook 165. 
29  Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
30  All forms of legislation include delegated and original legislation. 
31  Common law includes both the private law and the public law rules. 
32  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC). See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
169. 
33  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC). 
34  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 169. 
35  Section 36(1)(a) to (e) of the Constitution. 
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Thus it is clear that fundamental human rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
but only after a number of requirements have been fulfilled and if the limitation is 
for a legitimate reason. All human rights and their limitations in the Bill of Rights that 
are applicable to kidney donations will now be discussed. 
 
4 The right to life 
 
The right to life is regarded as the most fundamental of all human rights.36 The 
reason why this right is the most important is because it gives rise to all other rights. 
If a person is not alive he cannot be the bearer of other rights or exercise any of his 
rights, as observed by. O’Regan J in Makwanyane:37 
 
The right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all the other rights in the 
Constitution. Without life in the sense of existence, it would not be possible to 
exercise rights or to be the bearer of them. 
 
The importance of the right to life has been reflected by the fact that the right is 
protected by all international and regional human rights instruments.38 
 
4.1 International and regional human rights instruments 
 
The right to life is firstly and most importantly protected by the UDHR, Article 3 of 
which clearly states that: "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person". The right to life contained in the UDHR has become so established in 
international law that it is described as having a jus cogens39 character, thus 
meaning that no derogation of this right is permitted.40 The right to life is also 
                                            
36  Carsten and Pearmain Foundational Principles 27. 
37  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 326.  
38  Rehman International Human Rights 68. 
39  The notion of jus cogens has its origin in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 
which, in A 53 provides: "A treaty is void, if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general internal law having the same 
character." (Dugard International Law 43). 
40  Dugard International Law 43. 
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protected by article 6(1) of the ICCPR, which reads: "Every human being has the 
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of life". States such as South Africa that have ratified the ICCPR must at all-
time take positive steps to effectively protect the right to life.41  
 
At regional level the right to life is protected by article 4 of the ACHPR, which reads: 
"Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his 
life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right." 
In most cases the African Commission has followed the jurisprudence of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee regarding the right to life.42 However in some 
cases the African Commission has interpreted the right to life in a wider context. For 
instance, in the ground breaking case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v 
Nigeria43 the African Commission stated that the right to life implied a right to food 
as well.44 Even though the various international and regional human rights 
instruments may vary regarding the right to life, all of the instruments have in 
common the assertion that everyone has a right to life and that the state has an 
obligation to protect this right. In South Africa the right to life is ensconced in the Bill 
of Rights. 
 
4.2 The Constitution  
 
The year 1996 ushered in the dawn of a new era known as Constitutionalism, which 
changed the entire legal landscape in South Africa. Suddenly the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by the doctrine of constitutional 
supremacy.45 Constitutionalism now meant that the government could derive its 
                                            
41  Joseph 2011 http://bit.ly/ZoHrl2.  
42  Manby "Civil and Political Rights" 184. 
43  Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria Communication 155/96. 
44  This case was about the environmental pollution of the Ogoni territory. The African Commission 
was of opinion that that the Nigerian Government was obliged to protect existing food sources 
from (amongst other things) environmental pollution. The Commission stated in this case that 
the destruction of land and farms was a violation of the right to life (Danwood 2002 Human 
Rights Brief 17). 
45  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 2. 
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power only from a written constitution and that its powers would be limited to those 
set out in the Constitution.46 The Constitution as described in Makwanyane:  
 
provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded 
on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and 
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, 
belief or sex.47 
 
The Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that protects the rights of each South 
African citizen. One of the most fundamental rights provided by the Constitution is 
found in section 11 and reads that everyone has the right to life which, along with 
the right to human dignity, must be valued above all other rights.48 The 
absoluteness of the right to life has also been upheld in a decision of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court.49 In this decision it was said that other rights may be limited 
and may even be withdrawn and then granted again, but the right to life is absolute 
and must be preserved at all times.50 The South African Constitution differs from 
most other constitutions51 and also from the ICCPR due to the fact that it does not 
qualify the right to life.52 In the other constitutions the right to life is qualified due to 
the fact that the right to life may not be deprived arbitrarily.53 Chaskalson P remarks 
in the Makwanyane case that the right to life is given greater protection in the South 
African Constitution due to the fact that it is unqualified.54 According to section 7(2) 
of the Constitution the state has obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the right to life. These obligations impose negative and positive duties on the state. 
The negative duty implies that the right to life must be protected to the extent that 
                                            
46  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 8 
47  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 7. 
48  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 214. 
49  Decision 23/1990 (X31) AB, as referred to by Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 280 
note 3.  
50  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 83-85. See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 
Handbook 281. 
51  It differs from the constitutions of other jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada, 
Hungary, and India (Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 281). 
52  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 281. 
53  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 281. 
54  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 85: "Our Constitution does not contain the 
qualification found in section 54(1) of the Hungarian constitution, which prohibits only the 
arbitrary deprivation of life. To that extent, therefore, the right to life in section 9 of our 
Constitution is given greater protection than it is by the Hungarian Constitution". 
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no one else can take it away.55 For instance one’s right to life cannot be taken away 
by imposing the death penalty and one also has a right to defend one’s life by 
means of self-defence. The positive duty obliges the state to protect the lives of its 
citizens. The question can be asked, though, if the state’s duty to protect and 
promote life could be extended to include the prolonging of an end-stage renal-
failure patient’s life, where it is within the state’s capabilities to do so.  
 
4.3 The right to life and kidney transplants  
 
In all the international and regional human rights instruments that were mentioned 
above it is obvious that everyone has a right to life and that this right may not be 
deprived arbitrarily. The South African Constitution even contains an unqualified 
right to life, thus it is not limited in anyway except by section 36 of the Constitution. 
Yet, none of these human rights instruments discusses what exactly the right to life 
entails. In South Africa the right to life was intentionally left unqualified and the 
Constitutional Court was given the authority to develop the notion, which is exactly 
what the court did in the Makwanyane case. Although this case focuses mainly on 
the invalidation of the death sentence, a number of important remarks were made 
regarding the right to life. In this article I should like to focus on how the right to life 
can be interpreted in such manner that the scope is extended to include the 
prolonging of an end-stage renal-failure patient’s life by means of a kidney 
transplant. 
 
Thus far it is evident that the right to life definitely entails a physical existence. 
Nonetheless what is the use of a right to life as a physical being if it is not a life 
worth living? In Makwanyane O’Regan J commented that:56 
 
But the right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to enshrine the right 
to existence. It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, 
but the right to human life: the right to live as a human being, to be part of a 
broader community, to share in the experience of humanity. This concept of human 
life is at the centre of our constitutional values. The constitution seeks to establish 
                                            
55  Cartens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 26. 
56  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 326. Own emphasis added. 
B VENTER  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
362 / 536 
 
a society where the individual value of each member of the community is 
recognised and treasured. The right to life is central to such a society. 
 
Sachs J enhances the idea of a life worth living by adding that the right to life could 
possibly impose a duty on the state to create conditions which will enable all persons 
to enjoy a life worth living.57 It could be argued that a patient with end-stage renal 
failure does not live a life worth living. Studies have shown that patients on dialysis 
have a noteworthy decrease in their quality of life. A patient on dialysis has to 
receive dialysis treatment three to four times a week, and each treatment takes 
three to four hours.58 Renal dialysis has a number of side effects that can be divided 
into physical and psychological effects.  
 
Firstly the physical side effects are a decrease in energy levels and endurance, 
fatigue, headaches, pains, itchiness, loss of sight, nausea, cramps, infections and 
weight loss.59 All of these symptoms will seriously affect the performance of a 
person’s simple daily activities. The psychological effects include depression, 
aggression, fear, mental anguish, sadness and stress.60 Consequently it is obvious 
that a patient on renal dialysis has to make long-term health and life style 
adjustments. In addition to the burden of the physical and psychological side effects, 
renal dialysis involves a great deal of expense. If the renal dialysis is supplied by the 
state, it costs the state more or less R200 000 per patient per annum.61 The patient 
in the private sector can look at a financial setback of more or less R40 000 to 
R60 000 per month.62 To make matters worse the majority of patients are not 
healthy enough to attend work each day, or their occupation does not allow them to 
attend during the hours when renal dialysis takes place, thus after they are 
retrenched they also suffer a loss of income. Above all it should be borne in mind 
that renal dialysis is only a life-prolonging treatment. It is not a cure for renal 
failure.63  
                                            
57  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 353. 
58  Canadian Institute for Health 2010 http://bit.ly/Y0QNrz. 
59  Harillall and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 5. 
60  Harillall and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 5. 
61  De Klerk 2011 http://bit.ly/14dSC8b. 
62  Information supplied by Nurse R du Toit at Medi-Clinic Upington. 
63  Davison and Rosielle 2008 http://bit.ly/Z0ZaSX. 
B VENTER  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
363 / 536 
 
 
The ideal treatment for end-stage renal failure is a kidney transplant.64 Careful 
consideration of all the above mentioned facts may lead one to the conclusion that 
life on renal dialysis is not a life worth living. This is possibly the reason why so 
many patients decide to stop their dialysis treatment and rather go home to die.65 
However a renal transplant has a number of benefits and clearly increases one’s 
quality of life.66 In our Bill of Rights the state’s positive obligations to make life 
liveable is mostly codified in our socio-economic rights such as the right of access to 
adequate housing67 and the right of access to health care, food, water and social 
security.68 This approach was confirmed in the Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development69 case where it is said that the socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution are implicated with the right to life, human dignity, and equality.70 In 
these socio-economic right cases the availability of human and financial resources 
also has to be taken into account to determine whether the state complied with the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness.71  
 
In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu Natal)72 the court dealt with an 
application for life-saving medical treatment in the context of the socio-economic 
right to healthcare instead of the right to life. Soobramoney brought a constitutional 
application seeking an order for the hospital to provide him with access to dialysis 
treatment on the grounds that he needed emergency medical treatment. However 
the court dismissed his application because Soobramoney’s health could not be seen 
as demanding emergency medical treatment as his condition was an "ongoing state 
of affairs".73 This case is discussed in more detail later in this article. Nonetheless 
one is left to wonder if the court’s decision would not have been different if 
                                            
64  Harillall and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 2. 
65  National Kidney Foundation 2009 http://bit.ly/Y14Ptd. 
66  Harillal and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 2. 
67  Section 26 of the Constitution. 
68  Section 27 of the Constitution. 
69  Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). 
70  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 290. 
71  Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 44. 
72  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). Hereafter referred to as 
the Soobramoney-case. 
73  Soobramoney-case para 21. 
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Soobramoney was a 25-year-old healthy man with renal failure instead of a 41-year-
old man who was extremely sick.74 One can also wonder if the decision would not 
have been different if the application had been brought on grounds of a right to life 
and a right to access to healthcare, not on a right to emergency treatment.75 Surely 
the results would have been different? In my opinion it could be argued that, as said 
above, there is an onus on the state to provide end-stage renal-failure patients with 
conditions that constitute an enjoyable human existence. Chaskalson P comments in 
Makwanyane that the right to life is one of the most important rights and the source 
of all other rights, and that these rights must be valued and the state must 
demonstrate this in everything that it does. 76Thus the state could supply these 
patients with an alternative that is within their available resources. These patients 
could be allowed to obtain a kidney for transplant purposes by buying it in a 
constitutionally acceptable manner. Then only will these patients be able to enjoy 
their human existence instead of having a right to a life that entails constant pain 
and suffering.  
 
5 The right to human dignity 
 
The right to human dignity entails the acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of 
human beings.77 Human dignity is regarded as one of the supreme human rights. 
The reason for this is because the right to life and the right to human dignity are 
joined at the hip, as stated in Makwanyane by Ackermann J:78  
 
The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to 
human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a 
right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is 
substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity. 
 
                                            
74  As stated in the Soobramoney-case, Soobramoney was very ill. He was a diabetic who suffered 
from ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease. He had suffered a stroke and was in 
the final stages of chronic renal failure (Soobramoney-case para 1). 
75  In this case the Court suggested that the application of ss 27(1) and 27(2) of the Constitution 
were more appropriate to the facts of the case than ss 11 or 27(3) of the Constitution. 
76  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 144. 
77  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328. 
78  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 327. 
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Everyone has the right to be treated in a dignified and humane manner.79 The 
importance of human dignity is incorporated in various international human rights 
instruments as well as national constitutions. It is thus clear to see that human 
dignity is regarded as a universal duty and a universal responsibility.80 
 
5.1 International and regional human right instruments 
 
The main purpose of the right to human dignity is to try to correct the substantial 
violations of human dignity in the past and to prevent the reoccurrence of such 
violations in the future.81 The UDHR emphasises the importance of human dignity in 
its preamble, which states that the recognition of the inherent dignity of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
The right to human dignity is also protected in article 1 of the UDHR, which reads: 
"all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood." Additionally both the ICCPR and the ICESCR proclaim in their 
preambles that human rights are derived from the inherent dignity of the human 
person. Furthermore the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities82 explicitly 
asserts the importance of human dignity in articles 1 and 2 – which are categorised 
under the heading "Fundamental Principles for Humanity". Article 1 reads: "every 
person regardless of gender, ethnic origin, social status, political opinion, language, 
age, nationality or religion has a responsibility to treat all people in a humane way." 
Article 2 takes the responsibility even further and reads: "no person shall lend 
support to any form of inhumane behaviour, but all people have a responsibility to 
strive for dignity and the self-esteem of all others". 
 
At regional level the right to human dignity is directly protected in article 5 of the 
ACHPR, which reads: "every individual shall have the right to the respect of the 
dignity in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status". Human dignity is 
                                            
79  Goolam 2001 PELJ 46. 
80  Goolam 2001 PELJ 46.  
81  Botha 2009 Stell L Rev 174. 
82  The Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities (1997).  
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also protected in relation to the right to life in article 4 of the ACHPR, which reads: 
"every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his 
person". In comparison with Western philosophies, African traditions lay great 
emphasis on the responsibilities of an individual as compared with his rights.83 In a 
Western context the main focus is on individual rights, whereas in an African context 
the focus is on community responsibility and loyalty.84 A perfect example of this 
African sense of community is ubuntu. In the system of ubuntu the life of another 
person is at least as valuable as one’s own; thus respect for the dignity of every 
person is integral to it.85 Ubuntu is comprehensively explained by Mokgoro J in 
Makwanyane: 
 
Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it 
translates as personhood and morality. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on survival 
issues so central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of 
group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms 
and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. Its 
spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to 
conciliation.86 
 
It can easily be deduced that the right to human dignity plays a very important role 
in the South African Constitution since, as stated in section 1 of this contribution, 
South Africa is a sovereign democratic state founded on human dignity, freedom and 
equality.  
 
5.2 The Constitution 
 
In South Africa human dignity is regarded as the focal point of the Constitution, due 
to the country’s horrendous past of racial segregation. As said in Makwanyane by 
O’Regan J:87 
 
                                            
83  Goolam 2001 PELJ 47. 
84  Goolam 2001 PELJ 47. An ethic of community responsibility and loyalty can also be described as 
dharma. 
85  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225. 
86  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
87  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 329. 
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Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. 
For apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused 
respect and dignity and thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished. 
The new constitution rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all South 
Africans. Thus recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the 
new political order and is fundamental to the new constitution. 
 
Amongst the trinity of human rights that South African society is based on, the right 
to human dignity is the most important. Human dignity is entrenched in sections 1,88 
7,89 3690 and 3991 of the Constitution. Section 10 of the Constitution explicitly 
proclaims that: "everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected". As established by Chaskalson J in Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security92 human dignity is a central value of the objective, normative 
value system which must guide the development of all areas of law.93 South Africa is 
regarded as possessing one of the world’s most developed bodies of dignity 
jurisprudence. The only country that can compare with South Africa in this regard is 
Germany. Human dignity is not only a justifiable and enforceable right that must be 
respected and protected; it is also a value that is essential for the interpretation of 
all other fundamental rights and is of central significance to the limitation of other 
fundamental rights.94 In order to respect the right to inherent dignity everyone must 
be able to enjoy their civil and political liberties and also have access to the social 
and economic means essential to their development.95 It can thus be concluded that 
a person’s dignity is denigrated if he lives in degrading living conditions and is 
deprived of his basic needs.96 Consequently the question can be raised whether a 
person in end-stage renal failure, who is dependent on renal dialysis, lives a life of 
human dignity or not. 
                                            
88  Section 1 of the Constitution reads: "The republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic 
state founded on the following values: (1) human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms". 
89  Section 7 of the Constitution reads: "This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South 
Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom". 
90  Section 36 is the limitation clause that was discussed earlier.  
91  Section 39 is the interpretation clause that was discussed earlier. 
92  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 398 (CC) para 56. 
93  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 272. 
94  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 275. 
95  Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR 155. 
96  Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR 156. 
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5.3 The right to human dignity and kidney transplants 
 
In section 10 the Constitution of South Africa specifically guarantees the right to 
human dignity.97 It is clear to see from the discussion above that the right to human 
dignity, like the right to life, is the fountain from which all other fundamental human 
rights flow. Both of these supreme rights have an absolute nature and must be 
preserved at all times.98 If either of these rights is taken away, all other rights 
cease.99 It should be borne in mind that human dignity demands a humane 
existence, as emphasised by Ackermann J in Makwanyane:100 
 
The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to 
human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a 
right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is 
substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity. 
 
It can be deduced from this that life and human dignity are inseparable. 
Furthermore, health is an essential for both life and human dignity. It goes without 
saying that the capacity for the enjoyment of the right to life as well as human 
dignity is significantly diminished by poor health.101 According to the constitution of 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) dignity is a prerequisite of health. In this 
article the question is whether any human dignity exists in relation to renal dialysis, 
as well as to establish whether any human dignity is lost when a kidney donor 
receives a form of remuneration for the donation of his kidney. Lastly, a comparison 
is made between the mental anguish of a person on death row with that of a patient 
with end-stage renal failure. 
 
Given that the right to human dignity entails that everyone has the right to be 
treated in a dignified and humane manner, the question can now be asked if a 
patient with end-stage renal failure, who is dependent on renal dialysis, leads a 
dignified and humane life.  
                                            
97  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 58. 
98  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 84. 
99  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 84. 
100  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 327. 
101  Cartens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 29. 
B VENTER  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
369 / 536 
 
It could be argued that if a patient has to attend his renal dialysis therapy three to 
four times a week for three to four hours a session102 he is not living a dignified and 
humane life. The fact that this patient will have to make significant adjustments to 
his life style instantly impairs his human dignity. Furthermore it could be argued that 
if a patient has to suffer all the various physical and psychological side-effects 
described above his human dignity will be impaired. It is evident that a person’s 
human dignity is harmed when he has a decrease in energy levels, fatigue, pain, loss 
of sight, infection, nausea and cramps. The patient’s human dignity is impaired even 
more by psychological effects such as depression, aggression, fear and mental 
anguish.103  
 
It could also be argued that the dignity of neither the recipient of the kidney nor of 
the donor would be impaired in any way by means of kidney transplantation. It 
would be sensible to supply patients with viable donor kidneys and remove them 
from renal dialysis treatment. Kidney transplants would also be more cost effective 
than dialysis104 for society as a whole and would increase the recipient’s human 
dignity and life expectancy.105 This argument can also be extended to the 
constitutional acceptability of the regulated sales of donor kidneys. One of the main 
arguments against a regulated market of kidney sales is that the selling of human 
kidneys constitutes a commodification of the body and consequently results in a 
decrease of human dignity. In this matter the question can be raised as to why 
sperm donors, egg donors, milk donors and surrogate mothers do not suffer a loss 
of dignity, but a kidney donor does? The words of Gill and Sade could be used to 
emphasise the position that human dignity is not decreased if a kidney donor 
receives remuneration:106 
 
My kidney is not my humanity. In part, dignity is something that we convey by our 
behaviour and attitudes. If we establish a regulated system of sales, then it is our 
responsibility to create a culture of dignity for the paid donor. Many have suggested 
                                            
102  Canadian Institute for Health 2010 http://bit.ly/Y0QNrz. 
103  Harillall and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 5. 
104  The costs related to renal dialysis in comparison with a kidney transplant were discussed earlier 
in this article. 
105  Clark 2006 http://bit.ly/WWupRe. 
106  Gill and Sade 2002 Kennedy Inst Ethics J 20. See also Matas 2006 Clin J Am Soc Nephro 1131. 
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that the term "paid donation" or "rewarded gifting" be used to confer dignity to the 
procedure. 
 
The fact that a sum or value is placed on a person’s kidney does not lead to a 
diminishing of a person’s dignity. The court presently establishes the monetary value 
of the loss of or damage to a person’s body parts by means of damage claims. This 
does not lead to a decrease in the value of a person’s dignity.107 Slabbert states that 
monetary values are already attached to body parts: a diva is allowed to insure her 
voice and a tennis player can insure his arm. However, this does not diminish or 
impair their dignity.108  
 
I would like to extend the scope of the right to human dignity to the right not to be 
treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.109 In Makwanyane it was 
proclaimed that one of the reasons for the abolition of the death penalty was 
because it was found to be a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.110 In this 
case it was stated that:111 
 
Once sentenced, the prisoner waits on death row in the company of other prisoners 
under sentence of death, for the processes of their appeals and the procedures for 
clemency to be carried out. Throughout this period, those who remain on death 
row are uncertain of their fate, not knowing whether they will ultimately be 
reprieved or taken to the gallows. 
 
The question that should be asked is how the situation of the prisoner on death row 
differs from that of the patient with end-stage renal failure. The patient who receives 
renal dialysis is basically on "death row." He receives his dialysis treatment along 
with other patients that are in the same position as he is. Like the prisoner on death 
row the patient is also uncertain of his fate. He does not know whether he will 
receive a donor kidney or eventually be left to die when renal dialysis is no longer a 
viable option. In Makwanyane reference is made to the mental anguish that a 
                                            
107  Matas 2006 Clin J Am Soc Nephro 1131. 
108  Slabbert 2010 PELJ 86. 
109  Section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
110  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 95. 
111  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 26. 
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convicted prisoner suffers whilst awaiting his death sentence.112 Does a renal failure 
patient not suffer this exact same mental anguish whilst awaiting his "death 
sentence"? Furthermore the prisoner on death row does not have the burden of the 
financial implications that the renal dialysis patient has. It is regarded as 
unconstitutionally unacceptable to treat a convicted criminal in this manner but 
constitutionally acceptable in the case of an end-stage renal-failure patient. 
 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution entails that the state must respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the right to human dignity. From the above discussion it is evident that 
renal dialysis causes a decrease of a person’s human dignity. It is also evident that a 
renal transplantation has the opposite effect and increases the person’s dignity. In 
addition, it has been emphasised in this section that the sales of human kidneys 
would not lead to a decrease of human dignity. Thus the sales of human kidneys 
should be considered by the state as a viable and constitutionally acceptable manner 
to save thousands of lives whilst protecting a person’s right to dignity.  
 
6 The right to self-determination 
 
The right to self-determination implies that a person has a right to make decisions 
regarding his own body. Self-determination is closely associated with the bioethical 
perspective of respect for autonomy that incorporates the doctrine of informed 
consent. The idea of control over one’s own body can be illustrated by the 
following:113 
 
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of 
whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of 
will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from 
outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody: a doer – deciding, not being decided 
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I 
were a thing, or an animal or a slave … I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself 
as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to 
explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. 
 
                                            
112  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 6. 
113  Slabbert 2010 PELJ 96. 
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The idea of control of our own bodies is something that we as human beings 
practise every day through the various decisions that we are entitled to make. The 
importance of this right is clearly reflected in various international and regional 
human right instruments. 
 
6.1 International and regional human right instruments 
 
Like all other fundamental human rights the right to self-determination is firstly and 
most importantly protected by the UDHR. Article 3 stipulates that every individual 
has a right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 3 is comprised of three 
different rights: firstly the right to life, which includes the right to a humane 
existence (as discussed above), secondly the right to personal freedom, and lastly 
the right to security. The right to security entails the right to be protected against 
interference from the state as well as the protection of one’s integrity.114 The fact 
that the right to the security of the person is listed along with the right to life could 
mean that this right should be regarded as being just as important as the right to life 
and human dignity. In international law the right to self-determination has been 
described as "one of the essential principles of contemporary international law" and 
it has been said that this right enjoys an erga omnes115 character.116 Additionally the 
right to self-determination is protected by the identical provisions of the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR. Article 1 of these human right instruments provides that: "all peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development". Self-determination is very broadly defined in International law and 
thus leads to every state deciding individually what the exact parameters of this 
right are.117  
 
                                            
114  Rehof "Article 3" 89. 
115  Erga omnes can be described as obligations which a state owes to the international community 
as a whole and in the enforcement of which all states have interest (Dugard International Law 
43). 
116  Dugard International Law 104. 
117  Rehman International Bill of Rights 66. 
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At regional level the right to determination is even less precise. The ACHPR protects 
this right in article 20, which reads: "All peoples shall have the right to existence. 
They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They 
shall freely determine that political status and shall pursue their economic and social 
development according to the policy they have freely chosen". The right to self-
determination represents one of the most important roots of modern international 
human rights protection.118 Because this right is broadly defined, the African 
Commission has made numerous attempts to determine what exactly honouring the 
right to self-determination entails.119  
 
6.2 The Constitution 
 
The right to self-determination is guaranteed by the Constitution in section 12(2)(b), 
which reads: "Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which 
includes the right to security and control over their body". As noted by Ackermann J 
in Ferreira v Levin120 the purpose of this section is to protect aspects of bodily self-
determination. In Phillips v De Klerk121 the right to control one’s own body was 
recognized in so far as that right is not in conflict with the overriding social interest: 
 
The mentally competent individual’s right to control his own destiny in accordance 
with his own value system, his "selfbeskikkingsreg", must be rated even higher 
than his health and life. 
 
The right to self-determination basically entails the right to be left alone, and in 
relation to one’s body the right creates a sphere of individual inviolability.122 Section 
12(2)(b) explicitly illustrates that this inviolability has two components, namely 
"security in" and "control over" one’s body. The former entails the protection of 
bodily integrity against intrusions by the state and others; consequently the right to 
                                            
118  Killander "African Human Rights Law" 401. 
119  The African Commission has attempted to determine the exact parameters of the right to self-
determination in various examples of case law such as Katangese People’s Congress v Zaire 
Communication 75/92. 
120  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
121  Phillips v De Klerk 1983 TPD (unreported). 
122  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 308. 
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be left alone in the sense of being left unmolested by others.123 The latter entails the 
protection of what is described as bodily autonomy or self-determination against 
interference; consequently the right to be left alone in the sense of being allowed to 
live the life one chooses.124 In this section I will focus mainly on the latter right.  
 
The fact that self-determination is an essential right is clearly illustrated by the 
capacity it protects – the capacity to express one’s own character.125 By recognising 
an individual right of self-determination the Constitution makes self-creation 
possible. It allows each one of us to be responsible for shaping our lives according to 
our own distinctive personalities. Kriegler J observed in Ex Parte Minister of Safety 
and Security: In re S v Walters126 that if the right to life, to human dignity or bodily 
integrity are compromised than the society to which we aspire becomes illusory. 
Kriegler J further emphasised the fact that any significant limitation to any of these 
rights would for its justification demand a very compelling countervailing public 
interest.127 But if a person is allowed to decide upon the fate of his own body, could 
the scope of such self-determination possibly be extended make it possible for a 
person to have the right be remunerated for a kidney donation? 
 
6.3 The right to self-determination and kidney transplants 
 
A person’s typical day consists of making various decisions. Every waking moment is 
filled with decisions and choices such as what to wear, what to eat, and what his or 
her typical day will involve. In addition to these minor, mundane daily choices that 
one makes, one also makes major decisions that have an influence on one’s life, 
such as what religion, lifestyle or career to follow. Obviously, then, everyone has the 
right to make decisions regarding control over their own bodies. This right is, after 
all, guaranteed in various international human right instruments and even explicitly 
in the Constitution. Yet, these same autonomous persons are not granted the 
opportunity to choose to be remunerated for a kidney donation? 
                                            
123  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 309. 
124  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 309. 
125  SALC Assisted Decision-making 23.  
126  Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC) para 28.  
127  Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC) para 28. 
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South Africans are more aware of the fact that they have a right to self-
determination than they were 18 years ago. Since 1994 they have been allowed to 
become more and more autonomous by the day, even to the extent that since 1 
February 1997 mothers are allowed to legally terminate their pregnancies.128 In the 
landmark case Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health129 it 
was noted by Mojapelo J that if the state were to prohibit termination:130 
 
... the state’s interference would clearly constitute an impairment of women’s right 
"to bodily and psychological integrity" and more particular their right "to make 
decisions concerning reproduction" and "to security in and control over their body". 
 
Why is the termination of a pregnancy constitutionally acceptable yet a kidney donor 
is not granted the choice to be remunerated for the donation of his kidney? The 
Constitution clearly states that "everyone" has the right of control over their body, 
thus the kidney donor should be allowed to receive remuneration for his kidney if he 
wishes. At the very least, he or she should be given the choice of being 
remunerated. Presently a person only has the choice to donate a kidney altruistically. 
The pregnant mother is allowed to end the life of her unborn child because she 
firstly has the right to bodily and physically integrity and secondly the right to control 
over her body. As stated in the Christian Lawyers case131 "the fundamental right to 
self-determination itself lies at the very heart and base of the constitutional right to 
termination of pregnancy". 
 
Consequently, on the grounds of section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution a kidney donor 
has a right of control over his body and thus has the right to do with his body as he 
pleases. If one is allowed to end a life due to the possession of one’s fundamental 
right to self-determination than surely one should be allowed to save a life based on 
this exact same right. To make matters even worse, according to section 5(3) of the 
choice on termination of pregnancy act, any woman of any age is allowed to consent 
                                            
128  The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
129  Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T). 
130  Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T). See also 
Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 98. 
131  Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T). See also 
Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 92. 
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to an abortion.132 The implication of this section is that a minor as young as 12 years 
old is allowed to legally terminate her pregnancy without the consent of a parent. If 
a minor is allowed to make vital decisions regarding her body it could be argued that 
a competent adult kidney donor should be allowed to decide to donate a kidney and 
benefit financially in return. 
 
Because of a person’s strong right to self-determination a person even has the right 
to refuse medical treatment.133 In most cases the refusal of medical treatment 
results in death. It could be argued that if a patient is allowed to make decisions that 
could result in his death then a kidney donor should surely be allowed to make the 
decision to donate his kidney and receive remuneration for the donation. Donating a 
kidney does not result in death, as is the case with abortion or the refusal of medical 
treatment. It results in quite the opposite: it saves the life of another person. 
 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution entails that the state must respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the right to self-determination. From the above discussion it is clear that 
the right to self-determination has already been developed to a certain extent. It is 
regarded as constitutionally acceptable for women to terminate their pregnancies 
due to this right and for patients to refuse essential medical treatment. Both of these 
practices result in death – firstly the death of the unborn child and secondly the 
death of the patient. I am of the opinion that if a person is allowed to make such a 
decision on the grounds of the person’s constitutional right to self-determination, 
then a kidney donor should be allowed to receive remuneration for his kidney 
donation. The kidney donor is also entitled to the right to make decisions regarding 
control of his body. It should be borne in mind that a person is already legally 
allowed to donate his kidney, it is the remuneration of a kidney donation that is 
regarded as illegal. The question however could be raised what difference would the 
                                            
132  Section 5(3) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 reads: "In the case of a 
pregnant minor, a medical practitioner or registered midwife, as the case may be, shall advise 
such a minor to consult with her parents, guardian, family members or friends before the 
pregnancy is terminated: Provided that the termination of the pregnancy shall not be denied 
because such a minor chooses not to consult them" (Own emphasis added). 
133  Section 6(d) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 states that: "Every health care provider must 
inform a user of – (d) the user’s right to refuse health services". 
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added benefit of remuneration make to the kidney donor’s right to self-
determination? In my opinion it would make no negative difference. The donor 
chooses to sell his kidney. It is only a part of his body. After his kidney is removed 
he still has his whole body to have control over. If the remuneration of a kidney 
donor is regarded as constitutionally acceptable it will pose no disadvantage to the 
donor’s right of self-determination. It would instead develop his right,– which would 
then include the right to be allowed to choose to receive remuneration or not. The 
donor would be allowed to make his own decisions regarding his body whilst 
prolonging the life of another person in need of a kidney transplant. 
 
7 The right to privacy 
 
The right to privacy can broadly be defined as the fundamental right of an individual 
to isolate his private life from the interference of the state or other persons. This 
right makes it possible for the individual to control what he wants to share with or 
withhold from others. Privacy is regarded as a very important aspect of a person’s 
personality and thus a person has an interest in the protection of his privacy.134 In 
the last few decades the right to privacy has developed and become widely 
recognised in various human rights instruments.  
 
7.1 International and regional human right instruments 
 
The protection of territorial and communications privacy is explicitly guaranteed in 
the UDHR. Article 12 reads:  
 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.  
 
The right to privacy is also further dealt with in article 17 of the ICCPR. The phrasing 
of this article is identical to that of the UDHR. Article 17 has been elaborated further 
by the Committee’s General Comment and also by its case law under the Optional 
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Protocol.135 In the General Comment on this Article the Committee noted that the 
obligations imposed by it require the state to adopt legislative and other measures to 
give effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the 
protection of this right.136 
 
The right to privacy is not explicitly guaranteed in the ACHPR but it is found in most 
domestic bills of rights such as the South African Bill of Rights.  
 
7.2 The Constitution 
 
In South Africa an individual’s right to privacy is protected by both the common law 
and the Constitution. According to the common law every person has an 
independent personal right to privacy. In this section, however, I will focus only on a 
person’s constitutional right to privacy. 
 
Section 14 of the Constitution reads that "everyone has the right to privacy, which 
includes the right not to have their person or home or property searched, their 
possessions seized or the privacy of their communications infringed". The right to 
privacy has two parts: the first guarantees a general right to privacy and the second 
protects people against specific infringements of privacy such as searches, seizures 
and the infringement of communication.137 It should be noted that unlike the three 
fundamental human rights discussed earlier, the right to privacy is not absolute. It 
can be limited in accordance with section 36 (the limitation clause) of the 
Constitution. The purpose of this limitation is to enable the courts to find a balance 
between the public’s right to know and the individual’s right to privacy.138 
 
The right to privacy aims to protect three categories of an individual’s life. The first 
category protects a person against intrusions and interferences with his private 
                                            
135  Rehman International Bill of Rights 78. 
136  UN Human Rights Committee 1988 http://bit.ly/ZfoHEn paras 1, 8. See also Rehman 
International Bill of Rights 78. 
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life.139 In respect of this right a person is entitled to be left alone. The purpose of 
this right is to establish that the state and other people have nothing to do with a 
person’s intimate affairs. The second category protects a person’s privacy against 
infringement of his autonomy and allows every individual to choose the kind of 
lifestyle that he wants to lead. 140 The third category protects a person against the 
infringement of private information.141 This right is closely related to the right to 
human dignity, since the publication of false information that reflects negatively on a 
person can damage a person’s dignity.142 In this section the focus is mainly on the 
third category - informational privacy. In the medical context the right to privacy is 
further protected by section 14 of the National Health Act.143 Furthermore the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act144 stipulates that no person may disclose any 
information about a patient unless the patient gives his written consent, or a court 
order requires the disclosure, or the non-disclosure represents a serious threat to 
the public health.145 One could ask if the remuneration of kidney donors would 
constitute a breach of the donor’s right to privacy. 
 
7.3 The right to privacy and kidney transplants 
 
Information pertaining to a person’s health is regarded as highly confidential, and as 
stated above it is protect by the Constitution, the National Health Act and the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act. In Hyundai Motor Manufacturers146 it was 
noted that: 
 
Privacy is a right which becomes more intense the closer it moves to the intimate 
personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it moves away 
from that core ... 
                                            
139  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 324. 
140  Jordaan South African Consumer’s Information Privacy 25. 
141  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 323. 
142  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 323. 
143  Section 14 National Health Act 61of 2003 reads: "All information concerning a user, including 
information relating to his or her health status, treatment or stay in a health establishment, is 
confidential." 
144  The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
145  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 88. 
146  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In 
re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC). 
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It could easily be said that a kidney transplant is part of one’s intimate personal 
sphere of life. The right to privacy pertaining to a kidney transplant could easily be 
breached if a kidney donor’s identity is revealed to the kidney recipient. In this 
section I would like to show that allowing a kidney donor to be remunerated for his 
donation would not infringe his right to privacy. 
 
Presently, in South Africa the details of all cases of kidney donation are regarded as 
confidential, except of course in the case of living donors where transplants are done 
within the same family.147 The implication of this confidentiality is that the identity of 
the kidney donor is protected and is not revealed to the kidney recipient. The reason 
for this being so is that the kidney donor’s right to privacy is regarded as stronger 
than the kidney recipient’s right to information. 
 
In the United States of America a case study was done regarding whether or not the 
donor’s right to information would outweigh the recipient’s right to privacy if the 
kidney recipient was HIV positive.148 In this case study it was concluded that the 
recipient’s right to privacy was dominant, as a kidney donation is completely 
voluntary and the donor shouldn’t base his choice on the transplant outcome.149 I 
am of the opinion that if this case study were to be done in South Africa the results 
would be the same, mainly because the right to privacy is so strongly protected by 
the Constitution. I further feel that this case study emphasises the importance of the 
right to privacy. In South Africa especially the importance of the right to privacy is 
clearly illustrated by the fact that minors are allowed to obtain condoms, abortions 
and HIV tests without the knowledge of their parents.150  
 
Given this context it is argued that by allowing a kidney donor to be remunerated for 
his donation would not infringe his privacy. In Singapore the remuneration of kidney 
donors has had no effect on the privacy of the kidney donors. According to the 
Minister of Health of Singapore the identity of the kidney donor is confidential 
                                            
147  Organ Donor Foundation 2012 http://bit.ly/YqtVB8. 
148  Formica et al 2010 Clin J Am Soc Nephro 925. 
149  Formica et al 2010 Clin J Am Soc Nephro 925. 
150  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics 89. 
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information.151 The kidney donor’s privacy could be infringed only if his identity is 
revealed to the recipient. If remuneration is allowed it would not change the current 
position. The mere fact that the kidney donor would receive an added benefit does 
not force him to reveal his identity. 
 
8 The right to health care 
 
In all parts of the world a person’s health is vital to all other aspects of his life, such 
as his personal and social development. A person needs to be healthy to live his life 
to the fullest. Without health a person cannot do his work, care for his family or 
enjoy his life. Enjoyment of the right to life is interlinked with and crucial to the 
realisation of many other fundamental human rights such as the right to life, to 
dignity, to self-determination and to privacy.  
 
The right to health did not officially emerge from an international human rights 
instrument as did other fundamental rights but rather from an international health 
authority.152 In the preamble to the constitution of the World Health Organisation,153 
which was written in 1946, it was proclaimed that: "the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of living is one of the fundamental rights of every human being". 
According to the WHO, health can be defined as: "a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". 
Unfortunately, for the majority of the world and especially for South Africa, reality 
falls far short of the WHO standard.  
 
The right to health is further protected by international and regional human rights 
instruments.  
 
                                            
151  Minister of Health 2008 http://bit.ly/YqsHG5. 
152  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 108. 
153  Hereafter referred to as the WHO. 
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8.1 International and regional human rights instruments 
 
The right to health is protected in the first place by Article 25 of the UDHR, which 
reads: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care ...".154 The UDHR aims to promote "a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations".155 Unfortunately the UDHR has one missing component 
with regard to the right to health. It does not impose an obligation on the state to 
take positive measures toward the realisation of this right. This lacuna was 
addressed and corrected by the ICESCR. Article 12(1) of the ICESCR reads: "The 
State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health". The 
steps required for the realisation of these rights are stipulated in Article 12(2) of the 
ICESCR.156 The obligation to take steps toward the realisation of this right is 
mandatory, but every state has a margin of discretion in the choice of appropriate 
means for satisfying the right to health.157 The Committee on the ICESCR has 
established that there must be a maximum deployment of available resources 
towards the realisation of the right to health.158 If a state cannot meet the full 
realisation of a right due to its lack of resources, it must at least endeavour to meet 
a certain minimum-level content of the right.159 Consequently it can be deduced that 
the state must demonstrate that it has deployed its available resources to the 
maximum extent. It should be borne in mind that the Committee also emphasised 
                                            
154  The Article further states that everyone has the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other circumstances beyond his control resulting in 
the lack of a livelihood. The author regards only the first part of this definition as important to 
the discussion of the right to healthcare.  
155  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 111. 
156  Article 12(2) of the ICESCR reads: "The steps to be taken by the State Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) the 
provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child; (b) the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene; (c) the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases; (d) the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness." 
157  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 113. 
158  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 114. 
159  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 114. 
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that the availability and accessibility of health care for all individuals is a provision 
that should be sensitive to medical ethics and distinct cultures.160 
 
As a result of the influence of international human right instruments the right to 
health is also protected on regional level by the ACHPR. Article 16(1) reads "Every 
individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health". Article 16(2) provides for the realisation of the right by stating that: 
"State parties to the present Charter shall take necessary measures to protect the 
health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they 
are sick". It is clear that the right to health is an important right although compliance 
with its obligation remains rather problematic.  
 
The right to health is explicitly recognised as a fundamental right in the Constitution. 
 
8.2 The Constitution 
 
During the era of apartheid161 South Africa perpetrated a number of violations 
against the human right to health. The racial segregation of white and black people 
affected people’s health in a number of ways. The health of the disadvantaged was 
affected due to the poor social conditions in which they lived, which caused ill 
health, the segregation of state health services, and the state’s unequal spending on 
health services.162 Since 1994 health in South Africa has been recognised as a 
fundamental human right.  
 
The right to health is guaranteed explicitly by the Constitution in section 27(1)(a), 
which reads: "everyone has the right to have access to health care services, 
including reproductive health care."163 It should be emphasised that the Constitution 
does not guarantee a right to health, but only the right of access to health care 
                                            
160  UN CESCR 2000 http://bit.ly/102nBOG para 12. See also Rehman International Bill of Rights 119. 
161  From 1948 to 1994. 
162  Heywood "Background to Health Law" 11. 
163  Section 27(1) of the Constitution further states that everyone has the right to have access to 
sufficient food, water and social security. These rights, however, will not be discussed in this 
section. 
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services. Section 27 not only allows a person to have access to health care but it 
also follows the international example of the ICESCR by stating that the government 
has a duty to steadily improve people’s health care. Section 27(2) reads that: "the 
state must take reasonable legislative measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights." Section 27 imposes both 
positive and negative obligations on the state. The positive obligation pertaining to 
section 27(1) is discussed above. Section 27(3), however, imposes a negative 
obligation on the state by stipulating that no person may be refused emergency 
care. As with all other rights in the Bill of Rights, the state’s general positive duties 
regarding these rights are set out in section 7(2) of the Constitution. The state is 
required to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right to health. Section 27 is not 
an absolute right and is subject to the limitation clause.  
 
It should be borne in mind, however, that section 27 is not the only constitutional 
provision dealing with a right concerning health. As discussed earlier in this chapter 
the right to bodily and psychological integrity also directly protects a person’s health. 
Furthermore, the health of children and prisoners is also directly protected by 
section 28(1)(c)164 and section 35(2)(e)165 of the Constitution respectively. There are 
additional rights that have an indirect bearing on the right of health, such as the 
rights to life, human dignity, equality and housing.166  
 
As a socio-economic right, the right to healthcare poses a challenge to the courts in 
that the development of socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa is still in 
its infancy.167 The Constitutional Court has affirmed, though, that socio-economic 
rights are justiciable and that the principle of the separation of powers does not 
have the effect of depriving courts of competence over such rights.168 There have 
                                            
164  Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution reads that: "Every child has the right to basic nutrition, 
shelter, basic health care services and social services". 
165  Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution reads that: "everyone who is detained, including every 
sentenced prisoner, has the right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human 
dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment". 
166  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 130. 
167  Ngwena 2000 Med Law Int 2. 
168  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 132. 
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been four Constitutional Court decisions that have a direct impact on the 
development and the understanding of the right to health care. In this section I will 
briefly discuss only three of these cases and the direct influence they have had on 
the right to health.169 The relevance of these cases pertaining to kidney transplants 
will be discussed later in this article. 
 
The first and most important case to be discussed in this section is Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal. Soobramoney, a 41-year-old unemployed man, 
was a diabetic who suffered from ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular 
diseases which caused him to have a stroke in 1996. In that same year his kidneys 
also failed. His condition was regarded as irreversible and by the time of the court 
case he was in the final stages of renal failure. His life could have been prolonged by 
means of renal dialysis, but due to the limitations of the facilities available at the 
Addington state hospital dialysis was denied.170 His request was denied also because 
he did not meet the medical criteria for providing dialysis at state expense.171 It 
should be noted that prior to the application Soobramoney had been receiving 
dialysis via private care, but his funds had run out, which is why he sought dialysis 
from a state hospital.  
 
Soobramoney then decided to make an urgent application to the High Court for an 
order directing the Addington hospital to provide him with renal dialysis and 
interdicting the respondent from refusing him admission to the renal unit of the 
hospital. In his application he relied on section 27(3) and 11 of the Constitution.172 
The application was dismissed and Soobramoney appealed to the Constitutional 
Court. The Court was of view that the right to life argument was inappropriate in this 
                                            
169  The fourth case Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 4 SA 441 (C) will be omitted 
as it has limited value as a precedent and does not contribute to my argument. 
170  Soobramoney sought renal dialysis therapy from the Addington state hospital in Durban. The 
hospital provided treatment to only a limited number of patients due to the fact that their renal 
unit had only 20 dialysis machines. Some of the machines were already in a poor condition. The 
hospital further noted that each treatment takes four hours and a further two hours for the 
cleaning of the machine before it could be used again. 
171  Renal dialysis could be provided only to patients who were candidates for renal transplantation. 
Thus dialysis was provided only to patients who needed it as short-term therapy. As Mr 
Soobramoney was suffering from other diseases he was not a fit candidate for transplantation. 
172  Section 11 of the Constitution was discussed earlier in section 3 of this article. 
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case as the Constitution provided explicitly for the right to health.173 Regarding 
section 27(3) the Court was of the view that "emergency medical treatment" was 
capable of a broader meaning to include ongoing treatment for chronic conditions, 
but it was not so broad to include conditions such as chronic renal failure, but rather 
for sudden catastrophe or unexpected trauma.174 Soobramoney’s condition was 
described as an ongoing state of affairs and not an emergency which required 
immediate remedial treatment.175 The Court decided that section 27(3) did not apply 
to the facts of this case. The Court also emphasised that even if chronic renal failure 
could be regarded as an emergency, the state was not violating its obligation as its 
resources were scarce. If section 27(3) were to have been interpreted in favour of 
Soobramoney, the state’s obligation to ensure access to health care services would 
have been severely jeopardised. The state would have been constantly forced to 
provide immediate access to health care services wherever and whenever it was 
demanded.176 Although the state has a constitutional duty to comply with the 
obligations imposed on it by section 27 of the Constitution it was held in 
Soobramoney that the state did not breach its constitutional obligation by refusing 
Soobramoney renal dialysis. 
 
The second case pertaining to the enforcement of socio-economic rights concerning 
health is Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign177. This case was an 
appeal by the government against the decision of the High Court. The applicants had 
challenged the decision of the government to confine the dispensation of Nevirapine 
to 18 pilot sites for the purpose of the prevention of the mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV. The main argument of the applicants was that the 
government’s failure to provide access to all anti-retroviral therapy to prevent the 
                                            
173  "In our Constitution the right to medical treatment does not have to be inferred from the nature 
of the state established by the Constitution or from the right to life which it guarantees. It is 
dealt with directly in section 27" (Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal 1997 12 
BCLR 1696 (CC) para 19). 
174  The purpose of the right seems to be to ensure that treatment is given in an emergency, and is 
not frustrated by reason of bureaucratic requirements or other formalities. What the section 
requires is that remedial treatment that is necessary and available be given immediately to avert 
harm (Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu Natal 1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC) para 20). 
175  Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu Natal 1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC) para 21. 
176  Berger "Constitution and Public Health Policy" 36. 
177  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC) - hereafter referred to 
as the TAC-case. 
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mother-to-child transmission constituted a number of breaches of the provisions of 
the Constitution. The provisions that were being breached were section 7(2), 10, 
12(2)(a), 27, 28(1)(c), 195178 and 237.179 The applicants had been successful before 
the High Court, but the case had focused especially on the interpretation and 
application of section 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution. Botha J stated that the 
government had not taken reasonable measures to realise the right of access to 
health care. The judge had granted an order to make Nevirapine available to all 
pregnant women who gave birth in the public sector and to their babies if a doctor 
was of the opinion that the Nevirapine is needed. The government appealed to the 
Constitutional Court against the decision. The Constitutional Court upheld the 
decision of the High Court and the appeal was determined by the application of 
section 27. In the TAC-case it was stated of rights such as access to education, land, 
housing, health care, food and water:180 
 
These are the socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitution, and the state is 
obliged to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available 
resources to achieve the progressive realisation of each of them. In the light of our 
history this is an extraordinarily difficult task. Nonetheless it is an obligation 
imposed on the state by the Constitution. 
 
In this case it was held that the decision to confine Nevirapine to only 18 pilot sites 
was unreasonable and thus constituted a breach of the state’s obligations under 
sections 27(1) and (2) to the extent that it was rigid and inflexible.181 The mothers 
and their new-born babies outside the pilot sites were being denied a potentially life-
saving drug that could be administered within the available resources of the state. 
The judgement of this case illustrates that the Constitutional Court regards the state 
as a servant of the Constitution and that the state will be held to the duty to perform 
its constitutional duties.182 
 
                                            
178  Section 195 of the Constitution requires that public administration must be governed by 
democratic values enshrined in the Constitution and that a high standard of professional ethics 
must be promoted and maintained.  
179  Section 237 of the Constitution stipulates that all constitutional obligations must be performed 
diligently and without delay. 
180  TAC-case para 94. 
181  TAC-case para 80. 
182  Swanepoel Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Cloning 154. 
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The relevance of the last constitutional case of importance o this contribution, Khosa 
v Minisiter of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development183 lies 
in section 27(2) of the Constitution. The decision here deals with the costs of 
extending social security to all. This case considered the reasonableness of the 
statutory limitation on access to an existing social assistance programme, and how 
this affects the state’s positive obligation set out in section 27(2) of the Constitution. 
The Court rejected the state’s allegation that the extension of the benefits in 
question to all eligible permanent residents would impose an extensive financial 
burden on the state.184 In doing so the Court emphasised that the state had failed to 
provide clear evidence to show what the additional cost of providing social grants to 
aged and disabled residents would be.185 It can be deduced from this case that the 
state cannot simply plead poverty when it comes to realising a socio-economic right. 
Instead it has to make out a case that it is indeed limited by resources.186 
 
If a certain resource has been limited for a number of years, is the state not under 
an obligation to provide an alternative that could relieve the need for it?  
 
8.3 The right to health and kidney transplants 
 
In 1946 the WHO proclaimed that the highest attainable state of health is an 
objective to aspire to. It is all too evident that this objective has not been met in 
South Africa and will not be met in the near future. With the support of the relevant 
case law I should like to ask if the state is fulfilling its obligation in relation with the 
right to health. Thus, does the state really attempt to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation 
of health in the context of the availability of donor kidneys for transplant purposes? 
The author also asks if the state could not be expected to do more to provide an 
alternative, which where they lack the available resources to make more donor 
kidneys available would be to permit the remuneration of kidney donors.  
                                            
183  Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 
505 (CC), hereafter referred to as the Khosa and Mahlaule cases. 
184  Khosa and Mahlaule cases para 60. 
185  Berger "Constitution and Public Health Policy" 44. 
186  Berger "Constitution and Public Health Policy" 45. 
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Firstly I would like to focus on the general obligations imposed on the state by 
section 7(2) of the Constitution. This section requires the state to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the right to health. Each of these obligations can be analysed 
individually. To respect means that the government must respect the right of access 
to health care services by not unfairly or unreasonably preventing people from 
accessing health care services.187 In a way, it could be argued that if the state does 
not grant persons the option of receiving remuneration for their kidney donations, 
the state is unreasonably erecting a barrier against kidney recipients’ gaining access 
to available donor kidneys, and therefore to health care services. To promote entails 
that the state must create a legal framework so that individuals are able to realise 
their rights on their own.188 This obligation has a direct relevance to the 
remuneration of kidney donors. It could be argued that the state could create a legal 
framework that allows for the remuneration of a kidney donor, and thus individuals 
would be able to realise their right to health on their own. The obligation to fulfil 
entails that the government must create necessary conditions for people to access 
health care, by providing positive assistance, benefits and actual health care 
services.189 Once again the remuneration argument is of relevance to the obligation 
to fulfil. By allowing kidney donors to be remunerated the state is creating the 
necessary conditions for kidney recipients to access health care.  
 
Secondly I should like to focus on the case law discussed above and how it 
contributes to the argument in favour of remuneration for kidney donors. Even 
though the Court arrived at the correct conclusion in Soobramoney with relevance to 
the facts of this specific case, there were nonetheless a number of shortcomings. 
This case was about renal dialysis and therefore had relevance to kidney 
transplantations and the state’s available resources. The Court held that the right to 
life argument was inappropriate to this case. Yet the right to health and life should 
be seen as interconnected, because without the right to life no other rights are able 
to exist. By adopting this approach the Court unduly minimised the relevance of the 
                                            
187  Berger "Constitution and Public Health Policy" 33. 
188  Berger "Constitution and Public Health Policy" 33. 
189  Berger "Constitution and Public Health Policy" 34. 
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right to life.190 The Court also seemed to suggest that it had a limited role to play 
regarding decisions on the allocation of health care resources and the protection of 
socio-economic rights.191 The Court suggested that once it is asserted by a provincial 
or national health care provider that resources are unavailable, then that per se 
limits the realisation of the right of access to the service sought.192 It can be 
deduced from this that there is no promise in the judgement that the Court would 
actually ascertain whether the state and the provinces were in fact attempting the 
realisation of rights by making resources available that ought to be available, and 
utilising such resources effectively.193 In the Soobramoney case it was held that the 
state did not have to provide access to renal dialysis for people with Soobramoney’s 
medical condition. I should like to contest this opinion. What would the judgement of 
this case have been if the facts were somewhat different? What if Soobramoney had 
been a patient who was an eligible candidate for a kidney transplant? Surely the 
Court would then have granted him access to renal dialysis and as soon as a viable 
kidney came available access to a kidney transplant. According to the proper reading 
of this case, the state cannot spend vast amount of money on non-priority areas if 
the affect is to limit access to essential services.194 If kidney donors are remunerated 
this would have quite the opposite effect. In the first place the state would not have 
to spend vast amounts because the amount they would be paying for a kidney 
transplant would be less than the cost of renal dialysis.195 The state would actually 
save money. Secondly, renal failure cannot be regarded as a non-priority area in 
South Africa, seeing that the major health problems are regarded as being AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, gastroenteritis and hypertension.196 It should be noted that 
hypertension leads to renal failure and affects about 20% of the adult population.197 
Thirdly, if the state were to spend funds on the remuneration of kidney donor 
                                            
190  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 136. 
191  Moellendorf 1998 SAJHR 328. 
192  Moellendorf 1998 SAJHR 330. 
193  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 137. 
194  Berger "Constitution and Public Health Policy" 37. 
195  The cost of a kidney transplantation, R250 000, includes the cost of the ImmunoPro Rx 
medication that must be taken in the first three months. After the procedure the cost of a kidney 
transplant is approximately R100 00 per annum, as opposed to the cost of renal dialysis, which is 
R200 000 per annum. Information supplied by Prof RS Britz on 29 April 2012 
(rsbritz@gmail.com). 
196  Naicker 2003 Kidney International 119. 
197  Naicker 2003 Kidney International 119. 
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patients this would not limit access to essential services (in this case, renal dialysis). 
Instead it would lighten the burden on the renal dialysis machines, and more 
patients would therefore have access to this life-prolonging treatment while they 
wait for a viable kidney match. Another point I should like to raise is that the case 
was heard 15 years ago, in 1997. Surely after such a length of time circumstances 
must have changed? At the time when this case was heard the state could meet only 
30% of the demand for renal dialysis.198 Is this still the position today? Chaskalson P 
noted that:199  
 
The state has to manage its limited resources in order to address all these claims. 
There will be times when this requires it to adopt a holistic approach to the larger 
needs of society rather than to focus on the specific needs of a particular individual 
within society. 
 
If the Constitution allows the remuneration of kidney donors, then the state will be 
attending to the larger needs of society, seeing that there is a dire need for viable 
donor kidneys in South Africa.  
 
The approach of the Court in the TAC-case clearly illustrates that the idea of the 
minimum core should be seen as integral to rather than independent from the 
question of whether or not the state has taken reasonable legislative and other 
measures to discharge its duty.200 Ngwena and Cook are of the opinion that:201 
 
Treatment Action Campaign itself is an instance where the state lost sight of its 
obligation concerning protecting health and the notion of providing a minimum floor 
or protection that was easily within its reach. 
 
It could be asked if the state has not also lost sight of its obligations concerning the 
right to health of patients with end-stage renal failure. The demand for kidneys 
exceeds the supply extensively. There are not enough renal dialysis machines to 
keep patients alive whilst they await a viable kidney, neither are there enough viable 
kidneys available to relieve the stress of the dialysis treatment. It could be argued 
                                            
198  Soobramoney-case para 26. 
199  Soobramoney-case para 31. 
200  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 143. 
201  Ngwena and Cook "Rights Concerning Health" 143. 
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that kidney patients, like the mothers and children in the TAC case, also have a right 
to their life-saving treatment. "A floor of minimum protection," as said above, is 
easily within the state’s reach concerning kidney recipients. If the remuneration of 
kidney donors were to be allowed, more kidneys would be available and there would 
not be a lack of available resources.  
 
As averred in the Khosa and Mahlaule cases, the state cannot merely plead poverty. 
It has to make out a case that it is indeed limited by resources. If remuneration 
were to be allowed the state would not be limited by the resources available to it in 
the first place because enough kidneys would be available to meet the demand for 
transplants, and secondly because the funds presently available for dialysis could 
instead be used for transplants. 
 
Consequently it is my opinion that the state is not fulfilling its obligation in sections 
7(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution. The state is not respecting, promoting, protecting 
or fulfilling the kidney recipients’ right to healthcare. Furthermore the state is not 
taking reasonable, legislative and other measures within its available resources to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the right to health pertaining to those in need 
of kidney transplants. The dire lack of available kidneys has been a problem for a 
number of decades, and the state should therefore provide the kidney recipients 
with an alternative option. They should be allowed to obtain a kidney in a 
constitutionally acceptable manner by having the state remunerate the kidney donor. 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to examine if the remuneration of kidney donors could be 
regarded as constitutionally acceptable. In my opinion all of the constitutional rights 
that have been examined have proved that they could be used in favour of the 
remuneration of kidney donors.  
 
The right to life is regarded as the most important right of all the fundamental 
human rights because it is the foundation of all other rights. Without life no other 
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right can exist. It was held in Makwanyane that the right to life implied that it had to 
be a life worth living. I have argued that the pain and suffering that accompany 
renal dialysis are such that the life of the patients is not a life worth living, but that a 
kidney transplant would give the patients a better life. The right to human dignity is 
regarded as interconnected with the right to life. According to Ackermann J the right 
to life incorporates the right to dignity. Human dignity and renal dialysis cannot co-
exist. It is also argued that the worldwide argument that a kidney donor’s human 
dignity would be infringed if he received remuneration for his kidney donation is 
illogical. Furthermore the issue was also raised why the cruel and inhuman 
treatment of a criminal could be regarded as constitutionally unacceptable but the 
same treatment is regarded as constitutionally acceptable regarding an end-stage 
renal-failure patient. All persons are allowed to make decisions regarding their own 
bodies, as is guaranteed by the right to self-determination expressed in the 
Constitution. Thus, if a person is not allowed the option to decide whether or not he 
would like to be remunerated for his kidney donation, his right to self-determination 
is infringed. The remuneration of a kidney donor would have absolutely no effect 
whatsoever on the kidney donor’s right to privacy. The donor would still be allowed 
to remain anonymous. Lastly, due to everyone’s right to health care provided within 
the state’s available resources, the state should allow persons to be remunerated for 
their kidney donation. Consequently, more end-stage renal-failure patients would 
have access to renal dialysis until a viable kidney became available, and it would 
always be possible for the state to provide kidneys within its available resources for 
the purpose of transplant operations. 
 
If the state does not allow the remuneration of a kidney donor but merely leaves 
matters as they are at the moment, meaning that kidney donation is the only 
acceptable way to obtain a kidney, it could be argued that the state is infringing 
upon the rights to which a person is entitled by virtue of the Constitution. 
 
Consequently, after careful consideration of the above it should be thought to be 
constitutionally acceptable to remunerate a kidney donor for his kidney. The sales of 
human kidneys are currently legally prohibited. I am strongly of the opinion that the 
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legislation of kidney sales in a constitutionally acceptable manner would improve the 
current shortage of donor kidneys in South Africa. Furthermore, this would give hope 
to the thousands of South African patients who are presently waiting on a miracle. It 
would be reprehensible if the shortfall of legislative development is the only reason 
why South Africa is suffering from such an acute shortage of donor kidneys.  
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